Philosophy and Simulation by David Crookall

            In this article by David Crookall, an interesting look at the relationship between simulation and philosophy is examined. Crookall argues that simulation would be completely ineffective without the power of the human mind, philosophy included. He says that examination of the philosophy of simulation has been a neglected area of study despite its importance. Another fact he points out is that half the articles written on this subject have been written in the last decade, suggesting the contemporary nature of the subject matter. Without the human mind’s acceptance of a simulation, we cannot be convinced by it. The paradox he offers is that unless the human mind knows of the simulation it is entering in order to comprehend it as a simulation. The counter-argument to this is that some games that act as simulations include objects that do not resemble anything in our reality, yet the mind still knows how to interact with them, thus completing the act of simulation. The author ends the article with a confusing disclaimer about how the very mention of the idea of simulation in his article could defeat the ability for the human mind to be unable to comprehend it, creating a conflict of interest. He admits this is a confusing idea to wrap your head around.

            Although this article relates in no way to my own life, I did find what Crookall said in it very interesting. However, I believe that any simulation, if realistic enough, will be accepted by the human mind, whether or not it has an understanding or preconception of what the simulation will entail or not.


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